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SECURITY IN AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS
ABSTRACT
Security in automatic data processing systems is concerned
with the protection of equipment and data against unauthorized
modifications or destruction, and accidental or intentional
disclosure of information.
This report consists of two parts:
1.

An overview of current literature in the field.

In this

part, basic problems and solutions, terminology and concepts found

in the theoretical aspects of

d~ta

processing systems security are

described.
2.

A survey of the state of the art in a sample area.

During the survey, infonnation about actual applications of security
methods in the Orlando, Florida area was collected.
information was gathered

by

This

means of a questionnaire and it will

permit a comparative analysis between the usage of security
measures in large and small firms.
It is hoped that this study will provide valuable information
to both the computer practitioner and management and in addition,
will create an awareness of the important role that the security
function plays in an organization.
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INTRODUCTION
The use of computer systems has grown to the extent that
they have become a critical and indispensable resource in today's
society.
There is a widespread use of automatic data processing
technology by a large number of organizations.
Some examples of computer users are: The Department of
Defense, The Internal Revenue Service, The Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the banking industry, insurance companies, health
institutions, colleges and universities, manufacturing and
retailing businesses.
The demand for computer systems is growing rapidly as new
technological advances permit the marketing of a large variety of
electronic .processing equipment.

Some facts on this growth are

shown on Table 1 and Figure 1.
In addition to the increase in computer utilization, there
has been an increase in crime in our society.

The cost of

'ordinary• crimes against business had reached $23.6 billion in
1975.
tion ~

(U. S. Department of Justice.
1973, p.7).

Federal Bureau of Investiga-

Crime can affect businesses regardless of

location, although the incidence varies

by

the type of area.

growth of crime is described in Figures 2, 3 and 4.

The

1976

1980

1985

588

Calculating and
Accounting Machines

3574

647

1,110

1,335

3,450

SOURCE: U. S. Department of Commerce, Domestic and International Business
Administration, Bureau of Domestic Commerce, U. S. Industrial Outlook 1973, with
Projections to 1980 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973}, p.312
U. S. Department of Commerce, Domestic and International Business
Administration, Bureau of Domestic Commerce, U. S. Industrial Outlook 1976, with
ProJections to 1985 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p.288.

5,965

6,740 10,450 12,100 13,746 22,560

1975

1973

1972

Computers & Related
Equipment

Industry

3573

SIC
CODE

ELECTRONIC AND ACCOUNTING EQUIPMENT: PROJECTIONS
(Value of Shipments in Millions of Dollars)

TABLE 1

N

3

$/Millions
10,000
6,000
5,000
4,000

Electronic
Computing
Equipment

3,000
2,000

Calculating &Accounting
Machines

1,000
500
200

1967 1968 1969 1970 1971

Fig. 1.

1972 1973

Installed Dollars In Computing Equipment
1967-1973

SOURCE: U. S. Department of Commerce, Domestic and
International Business Administration, Bureau of Domestic
Commerce, U. S. Industrial Outlook 1973, with Projections
to 1980 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office,
1973), p.321.
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7

This high level and variety of crime could not leave the
field of computer applications untouched.
involving

au~qm~ted

A number of incidents

information systems is found in Table 2.
TABLE 2
COMPUTER RELATED CRIMES
1964-1972

Category of Incident

No. of Incidents

Sabotage

15

Theft

23

Copying (Data)
Tampering

8

23

Masquerading

2

Fraudulent Activities

5

76
SOURCE: Ruth M. Davis, 11 Privacy and Security
in Data Systems, .. Computers and People 23
(March 1974): 25.
If the three factors discussed above (increasing computer
usage, crime and computer related incidents) are considered and
analyzed, it can be easily concluded that the need for security in
data and computer systems has become increasingly important.
The evolution of the computer from a laboratory curiosity,
to a prestigious luxury, to a vitally necessary administrative tool

8

has brought with it many problems in the areas of security,
accuracy and privacy.
The probTem ·of computer security has also been changing in
nature.

Early systems could have been provided with a large

degree of protection by strict physical security procedures.

The

computer could have been made basically secure by virtue of the
fact that the entire system could have been placed behind a well
guarded wall, thereby restricting access to the machine for input
and output with relative ease.
As computer systems have grown more sophisticated and varied,
and time-sharing operation, telecommunications, multiprograrrming,
and mass-storage devices have become available, new security
procedures have been needed.
furnish security measures.

However, it is not enough to simply
Measures should not only minimize risk

and probability of loss, but should be available at a reasonable
cost.
Important decisions about costs and risks must now be faced
by

management and it must become aware of the general problems and

solutions of the data processing security areas.
A trade-off between the degree of protection and cost is now
essential in that a great deal of computer security can be provided
with today's technology but onl y at a significant cost.

9

Management should understand the basic concepts and threats
to the information proeessing system in order to approve and direct
the implementatton of security procedures.

10

CHAPTER I
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND PROCEDURE
The objectives of this report are:
1.

To acquaint the reader with some basic concepts

and terms found in the field of computer security.
2.

To describe the most common threats to

electronic data processing applications.
3.

To present a set of basic general solutions

available to countermand the possible threats.
4.

To discuss the weaknesses found in existing

firms and recommend possible solutions.
The scope of the report will be limited to five areas of
analysis:

personnel, physical, backup,

programs and documentation.

develop~ent,and

data

Within each one of these areas the

following will be discussed; general security problems, general
guidelines (or procedures), the questionnaire used for the survey,
the results obtained and an analysis of those results.
The procedure followed to accomplish the proposed objectives
consists of two parts:
1. An overview of current literature in the
computer and data security area.

From this

study, basic concepts, threats and general
guidelines are obtained for later discussion .

11

2.

A survey of actual applications of security

methods was performed.

This information was

gathereo by means of a questionnaire and it will
permit a comparative analysis between the usage
of computer security procedures in large and
srna 11 f i nns •
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CHAPTER II
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The desired end product of the four objectives stated in
Chapter I is a set of countermeasures that will penmit the proper
functioning of the data processing system.

Proper functioning is defined as the satisfactory completion
of all necessary and desirable functions of the data processing
application.
The applications should be performed without the loss of any

data, the introduction of errors, or permitting data to be read
or modified with no authorization.
To accomplish the desired level of functioning, a variety of

preventive, protective, recovery and detection procedures should
be applied.

These are the types of measures that will be discussed

in this report.
The need for these various measures can be summarized as
follows:
a)

The probability of a hazardous event happening

at all should be minimized and the actions taken
should be preventive.
b)

Controls should be designated to detect and

minimize the damage of threat if it does occur.
The preventive actions will not always work,

13

therefore, it is necessary to protect the
personnel, hardware and software from the
harm -tnat could result.
c)

Designing a method of recovery from damage

is vital to the overall security plan.

If

damage has occurred, there must be plans to
make a quick recovery possible.
It is the responsibility of management to concern itself with
the safeguarding of resources under its jurisdiction, and to
organize, control and direct both human and capital resources.
It is important to recognize that there are no simple
formulas for examining the oost-value trade-offs in applying data
security measures.
The security procedures for any given system or installation
are unique to its specific needs.

There is not a prescribed set of

rules that can guarantee complete security for all conditions.
The decision t c

i~plement

any given set of data security

techniques must be related to the degree of vulnerability of the
computer, the value of the data in question, the policy guidelines
and natmosphere of concern 11 provided by general management.
Types of security exposure organized under six classifications
(Acts of God, har'dware and program failures, human carelessness,
malicious damage, crime and invasion of privacy) are presented in
Table 3.

This type of table is an example that can be used to

define the different types of threats to which the computer system

14

rr.ay be exposed.

A graphical description of the interrelationships between

threats and ltrres of defense is presented in Figure 5.

The nucleus

of the methodology for control of security and accuracy lies in the
design of the computer system and its programs, but it is important
to consider that a set of layers of control are necessary to
improve the protection against
different types of threats .
..
It is common to hear or read stories about computers making

phenomenal and sometimes pitiful errors.

A brief presentation of

the seven most common causes of errors may be found in Figure 6.
To maintain accuracy and security in a computer system the

rate of errors must be minimized.
It is extremely important to recognize the possible threats
and estimate the probability of occurrence in order to design th.e
necessary countermeasures.

(. 15
{

TABLE 3

---

TYPES OF SECURITY EXPOSURE

ACTS OF GOD
Fire
Flood
Act of War
Other Catastrophe

HARDWARE AND PROGRAM FAILURES
Computer outage
File unit damages disk track
Tape unit damages part of tape
Disk, or other volume, unreadable
Hardware/Software error damages file
Data Transmission error not detected
Card (or other input) chewed up by machine
Error in application program damages record

HUMAN CARELESSNESS
Keypunch errors
Terminal operator input error
Wrong volume mounted &updated
Wrong version of program used
Accident during program testing
Mislaid tape or disk
Physical damage to tape of disk ·
MALICIOUS DAMAGE
Looting
Violent Sabotage
Nonviolent sabotage (e.g. tape erasure)
Malicious computer operator

u

p

n

0

1
i

s
s

k
e
1

i
b
1

e
1

y

e

y

L
i
k
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TABLE 3 - Continued

u

p

n

0

1
i
k

s
s

L
I<

e

1

i
b
1

y

e

y

e

i
1

MALICIOUS DAMAGE - continued
Malicious prograrnrrer
Malicious tape librarian
Malicious terminal ooerator
Malicious· user (e.g.· punches holes in
returnable card)
.
Playful malignancy (e.g. using terminal
for fun)
CRIME
Embezzlement
Industrial espionage
Employees selling commercial secrets
Employees selling data for mailing lists
Data-bank information used for bribery
or extortion

INVASION OF PRIVACY
Casual curiosity (e.g. salaries)
Looking up data for a competing corporation
Obtaining personal information for
political or legal reasons
Nondeliberate revealing of private info
Malicious invasion of privacy
SOURCE: James Martin, Security, Accuracy, and Privacy in
Computer Systems (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prenti ce-Hall~
19 73) ' pp. 12-13.
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feel. mow
M1schicC
~.t.mult

Fig. 5.

Threats and Their Usual Defense.

SOURCE: AFIPS Systems Review Manual on Security
(Montvale, New Jersey: American Federation of Information
Processing Societies, 1975), p.9
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HARDWARE ERRORS

Yt:ry infrequent. Hardware can be designed to
detc:c.:t victually all its own errors.
S(JFTWARE ERRORS

Especially in new sofrware
that has had little "field" testing. A nuisance but not
a major cause of ~rrors in output.
ERRORS IN APPLICATION PROGRA\IS
The usual cause of wild behavior in a

computer system. The cure: thorough
program testing.
OPERATOR ERRORS

For example, an operator incomctly recovering
from a card jam or other failure.
Solution: foolproof operating procedures..
- - - DATA-INPUT ERRORS
"Garbage in: Garbage out. Cause:
errors in keypunching. terminal entry or
orher manual input ; use of wrong data.
Necessary: keypunch verification, input
controls, accuracy tests. Faulty input is the
biggest cause of ucomputer errors,.

INAPPROPRIATE PROGRA\1 DESIGN
Invalid decision-making process. Ne~ect of important
pai6Uneten. For example: inappropriate method of
setting overbooking limits in an airline may result in
passengers being stranded at the airport.
QUESTIONABLE SYSTE.'1 PHILOSOPHY
For example:. the system is insuificiently tlexible to h3ndJc unanticipated
events; the system methodology imposes undesirable constraints
on the operuting environment ~ the effects of invalid data
are acted upon without a double ~heck (e.g., consumer's
electricity is incorrec[ly cut oft).

Fig. 6.

Sources of Computer Errors

SOURCE: James Martin, Security, Accuracy, and Privacy
in Comouter Systems (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
1973), p. 23.
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CHAPTER III
DEFINITION OF A FEW GENERAL TERMS
Before stating

soJ~

of the most desirable conditions in a

security program for an automatic data processing facility, it is
important to define some basic concepts such as:

security, privacy,

confidentiality and anonymity.
1)

Security refers to the protection against unauthorized
.,

disclosure, destruction or modification of (1) data, (2) software,
(3) hardware, whether intentionally caused or resulting from

accident or carelessness.

A brief descriptjon of what security means is given in
Davis 1974, p. 21.
Data .security is the protection of data against accidental
of intentional destruction, disclosure or modification
using both physical security measures and controlled
accesibility. Physical security as it pertains to computers,
does not differ from physical security for other
installations. It is achieved through the use of locks,
guards, badges, personnel security clearances and
administratively controlled measures outside the computer
as well as measures required for the protection of the
structures housing the computer and related equipment
against damage from accident, fire and environmental
hazard, thus ensuring the protection of their contents.
Controlled accessibility is the set of technological
measures of hardware and software available in a computer
system for the protection of data.

20

2)

Privacy relates to the rights of individuals and

organizations to determine for themselves when, how and to what
extent information about them is to be transmitted to others.
As stated in AFIPS Systems Review Manual on Security
1975' p. 2. '

Privacy is therefore primarily a matter of an individual's
personal concern with respect to information that may or
may not Pe collected or divulged about himself or his affairs.
Privacy is thus a matter of individual rights defined by
public policy, court decisions, and legal statutes,
ordinances, or regulations.
3)

Confidentiality is a concept that deals with data,

specifically it refers to the degree of protection which will be
provided to minimize potential invasions of privacy.
·As described in AFIPS Systems Review Manual on Security
1975, p.2.

Confidentiality involves relationships or agreements
between the sources of information and the collectors,
diseminators, or users of that information. It is a
matter of protection of privacy (or of other constraints
upon disclosure, distribution, or use of sensitive
information). The area of confidentiality, rather than
that of privacy per se, is thus the primary concern for
system designers, systems managers, operators, users
and evaluators.
4)

Anonymity is a term which is described by Mosmann 1976,

p. 170.

To attempt to hide publicly known facts, to remove or
obscure such facts from the historical records {forget
what has taken place in public, to erase the record, to
decline to report).
Our anonymity has been protected when it has been
protected at all -by inefficiencies of record keeping,
and is attacked by efficiency and computer technology.

21

These general concepts implicitly suggest that any data
processing mechanism {being it manually or automatically operated)
needs some kind of protective measures.

These set of protective

measures imply a multistage problem that will be discussed in the
next chapter.

22

CHA T R IV
THE STUDY AND RESULTS
I troduct1on and Bas1c Framework
Although a prescription of specific security measures cannot
be defined for all organizations, the literature in the field
provides enough guidelines and information about security procedures
to build a basic theoretical framework.
These general guidelines contain the type of technical
measures that will tend to minimize the risk of violating the data
integrity and security in data processing systems.
The basic structure is formed by five sections or important
categories of control:

Personnel, Physical, Backup, Development,

and Data, Programs and Documentation.

These general sections will

be subdivided by specific areas of operation:
General Management
Exit Policies
'A.

Employee Identification

Personnel

Vendor Hiring Policies
5,

Hiring Policies

23

B.

=-------

- - - - - - - - - 1•
Physical
2.

-.-

c.

Backup

D.

Deve·lopment

Access Controls
Protection Equipment

3.

Housekeeping

1.

Backup and Fall-back

----1.

Program Development Procedures
Data and Programs Access
&Control

E.

Data, Programs
& Documentation
2.

Logs & Instructions

Discussions and analysis will be organized by subsections as
presented above. ·The questionnaire used in the survey was
designed to collect information about each of the areas of
operation mentioned 'above and it is described in more detail in
Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.
The survey consisted of eight companies (five small firms
and three large ones) in the Orlando, Florida area.

The prime

criterion used to differentiate between small and large
organizations was the total monthly rental for the computer system.

A computer user who pays less than $10,000 per month for rental of
the computer system is considered a small organization and vice
versa if the user pays more than $10,000.
The questionnaire was filled out
views.

by

means of personal inter-

The person being interviewed (Security officer or data

24

processing manager)

in each case was asked to answer the questions

as accurately as possible, it was also guaranteed that the identity
of the company anq _the answers given will be kept completely
confidential .
Personnel Section
Statement of The Problem
The basic protection of a data processing system begins with
the integrity of people that have access to the hardware, software
or handle any data.
A comment about the importance of personnel is found in
AFIPS Systems Review Manual on Security 1975, p.l2.
In the end, preservation of privacy rests not with machines
but with men. The effectiveness of all protective measures,
however sophisticated they may become, will still depend
upon people: operators, service personnel, supervising
officers, and all those who decide what information to put
into a computer and how . to use it.
The basic approach to maintain security in this area is to
hire honest people, orient personnel on company•s security
procedures and design controls to minimize temptations.
General Guidelines
· In order to maintain an acceptable level of control over
personnel, the following measures are indispensable:
A.

Personal and employment references, qualifications and

skills of all applicants should be thoroughly checked.
B.

Special orientation and training programs should be

25
provided where employees are found to be deficient in necessary
qualifications and skills.
C.

All empl-oyees should be thoroughly indoctrinated with the

policies and practices of the organization, especially with respect
to matters of confidentiality and security.
D.

As small a number of people as possible should be

entrusted with matters involving confidentiality and security.
E.

Management should establish a protection program for

employees against damage or injury, attack, and bribery or coercion.
A safe environment must be engineered to assure the safety of the
workforce.
F.

Employees critically engaged in the handling or processing

of sensitive or privileged information should be bonded, licensed,
and/or certified.
G.

Refresher sessions on security, confidentiality and

protection of privacy should be held with all responsible personnel
at regular periodic intervals.
H.

Suspension and termination procedures must be carefully

designed and conscientiously applied.
I.

Suoervisors should maintain close and effective
'

communications with their staffs.

They should try to be sensitive

to feelings and attitudes so that they can act affirmatively in
cases of potential dissatisfaction, suspicious behavior or unusual
attitudes, work habits and life style.

26

J.

One individual should never be totally responsible for a

given activity especially if it relates to the processing or
developwent of sensitive applications.
K.

The employee morale should be kept high, to accomplish

this, programs such as:

fringe benefits, educational and

professional development, stock options, adequate work spaces,
parking areas and suggestion boxes, should be considered.
L.

~special

screening procedure should be available to

check personal and employment records of:

consultants, part-time

and temporary employees, maintenance, service

~nd

janitorial

personnel.
The Personnel Section Questionnaire
This section of the questionnaire is directed to collecting
information about personnel policies and procedures, pre- and
post-employment investigation, general management involvement in
the design and revisions of security systems, and a definition of
the most likely confidentiality/securi.ty threats to the

organizat i on~

as seen in Figure 4.
Analysis of the Results
From the results obtained in this study, it can be easily
seen that large organizations use a high percentage of protective
and control measures in the personnel area .. A bit more of management involvement in security matters and publication of emergency
plans is desired to have better coordination.
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Small companies could augment their security measures in this
area without increasing their expenditures very much.
If an organizat.ion cannot afford a full-time security officer
or if it is not economical then a systems analyst(s) or a staff
member(s) related to data processing can be appointed security
officer(s) and safety committee as part of his/their responsibilities.
Once an assignment is made and somebody has been appointed
responsible for the development and implementation of security
measures then a security program can be started.
Managers, supel"visors and employees within the fi·rm can be
asked for suggestions about protective, preventive and detection
measures . . This is one way to collect information and get the
employees and principally management involved with security matters.
Inexpensive measures that will increase control and
protection can be implemented in both small and large companies,
although the study results show that only a relatively low percentage of small companies are using them.
that can be taken are:

Some of the measures

posting and publication of emergency plans,

issuing of employee identification cards, orientation about
regulations and policies, form that clearly states that any
misrepresentation will cause immediate dismissal, photograph taken
to become part of personnel record and dismissal interviews.

28

TABLE 4
PERSONNEL SECTION COMPARISON OF RESPONSES
-

.

% OF

1.
1 . 1•

1 . 2.

1. 3.

1. 4 • .

1 . 5.

1 . 6.

1.6.1.

1.6.2.
1.6.3.

1.6.4.
1.6.5.
1.6.6.

11

LARGE
FIRMS

QUESTION
GENERAL MANAGEMENT
Is there a Security Official responsible
for developing and controlling security
programs?
Is there an active safety committee which
searches out and arranges elimination of
safety hazards common to most commercial
and industrial environments?

YES"
SMALL
FIRMS

100

20

100

40

Are security policies, procedures and
67
programs formally reviewed by management?
How often?
Are names and telephone numbers of key
100
personne 1 to be called in case of
emergency clearly posted in all critical
areas?
Are published copies and revisions of
67
emergency and disaster plans distributed
to all management personnel responsible
for the execution of security and recovery
actions in case of a disaster?
What are the most likely sources of threat
to the confidentiality/security of the
system?
33
i ) Industrial espionage?
33
ii) Malicious damage or theft of
information?
33
iii) Accidental invasion of privacy?
67
iv) Fraud or embezzlement?
I
67
v) Hardware or program fai l ures?
33
vi) Accidental damages? ,

40

I

I
I

I
I

I

_l

40

20

0

0
I
!

I
I

!

20
40
60
60
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TABLE 4--continued
% OF

QUESTION
2.
EXIT POLICIES
2. 1.
Are interviews conducted upon dismissal
of employee in order to recover identification cards, keys, records and
manuals, collect and observe any hostile
reactions? When is employee informed of
termination?
3.
EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION
3. 1 .
·1s photograph of job applicant taken
i~mediately upon employment to become
part of personnel record?
3.2.
Are employee identification cards issued
and if so, do they include: recent
photograph, signature, issuing date,
means of preventing alteration?
4.
VENDOR HIRING POLICIES
4.1.
Are there adequate security procedures
for:
4.1.1.
i) Maintenance employees?
4.1.2.
ii) Janitorial personnel?
4. 1. 3.
iii) Temporary employees and
consultants?
5.
HIRING POLICIES
5. 1 .
Does employment application form clearly
indicate that any misrepresentation,
falsification or withhoiding of
information will cause for dismissal at
any time after employment?
Are the applicant•s personal and employ5.2.
ment references checked by means of
personal meetings, telephone or mail?
Does pre-employment investigation include
5.3.
a criminal records check?
Are new employees given through brief5.4
ings (orientation) on the policies,
regulations, and practices of the organ.

LARGE

YES
SMALL

FIRMS

FIRMS

100

20

100

0

67

0

100
100
100

20
60

100

40

100

60

33

0

100

40

11

11

20
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Physical Section
Statement of The Problem
In order to p_roperly discuss the threats with which the
physical security measures deal, it is necessary to classify them
into four categories:
Natural disasters
Manmade disasters
•

Unauthorized access
Hardware and utility failures

Each one of these categories will be further subdivided into
specific areas.

It is important however, to understand that many

of the problem areas are interrelated to each other, and that
improvement of security in one type of threat may result in
improvement of other problem areas.

As can be seen in Figure 7, t he

threats and remedial measures are interdependent.
Physical security should be of concern not only for critical
areas such as the data processing room and volume library, but for
every aspect of system development and operation.
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Natural Disasters
Definition of The Threat
Natural disasters ()r Acts of God are a type of threat in

which human intervention is non existent.

The security planner has

no control over the occurrence of these threats and the best
measures will be the ones that will minimize the damage caused if a
disaster should happen.

Some of the threats that can be classified

under natural disasters are:
1•

Windstorm

6.

Explosion

2.

Hurricane

7.

Flood

3.

Tornado

8.

Lightning

4.

Earthquake

9.

Ice and Snow

5.

Fire

10.

Rain and Mud

All of these events tend to have the same basic effects on
data processing applications:

complete or partial destruction of

the facility and its contents and therefore, interruption of normal
operations.

They also represent a threat to the health and lives

of the personnel.
obtained

by

Security and protection in this field can be

maintaining acces.s controls; fire alarm, prevention and

extinguishing systems; general safety and surveillance activities.
General Guidelines
Some general protective measures can be taken to minimize
damage in the event of disaster:
A.

An analysis of frequencies and damages caused by windstorms,
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hurricanes and tornadoes in the region where the computer center is
located.

Information can be obtained from the local National

Weather Service Office and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration.
B.

A study and plan should be implemented to protect the

facilities against structural damage, flooding and loss of
electric power due to high winds, earthquake or explosion.
C.

The selection of the building:

structural resistance

and its location is of prime importance.

D.

Emergency procedures should be available in case of

interruption of transportation, supporting utilities and other vital
services.
E.

The security planner and systems analyst(s) should be

aware of power characteristics:

quality and reliability.

F. There should be measures to insure prompt detection of
fire (heat and smoke detectors), adequate means and personnel to
limit damage and assure prompt recovery.

Some of the most common

extinguishing mechanisms are:
i)

ii)
iii}

Portable or hand extinguishers
Hose lines
Automatic sprinkler systems (water)

Volume extinguishment systems (HALON- 1301,
Carbon dioxide - co 2-)
Combustible materials should be kept in safe places where

iv)
G.

they cannot be easily ign i ted and there is not likely to be a source
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of ignition.
H.

The building and the equipment in it can be better

protected if the

de~i_gn

and construction of the building is safe:

the structure of the building is constructed

o~

non-combustible

materials; there are low-flame-spread materials for floors, walls
and furniture; fire walls; stairwells, dampers or shutters in ducts.
I.

Safety programs should be regularly offered to employees.

J.

Documentation, cards, magnetic tapes and disks should be

kept in water and fireproof vaults when not being used.
K.

It is prudent to consider some· countenneasures if the

flooding exposure is highly probable: emergency pumps, drains,
sandbags and masonry curbs.
L.

An analysis of electric power line fluctuations and the

effect of these in the hardware is necessary.

Some fluctuations

caused by lightning may generate logic errors, erroneous data
transfer and even damage the hardware.
Man Made Disasters and Unauthorized Access
Definition of the Threats
Man made disasters are those in which human beings are
responsible for the occurrence of a catastrophe.
The problem of unauthorized access can be discussed together
wi.th man made disasters because many of the preventive measures are
common to both· threats.
Most of the plans. designed to minimize damage and recovery
in the event of a natural disaster are also applied against man
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made disasters.

It is important to recognize that human beings are

behind the occurrence of a catastrophe in these types o'f threats.
It is to be

e~pe~ted

that intruders will find a way to

penetrate the protected areas if enough time and resources are
available to them and the rewards are of sufficient magnitude to
-

I

make such access attractive. -rhus·; one thing to keep in mind at
the time of designing the security measures is that the cost of
obtaining some information or causing damage to the data processing
system should be more expensive than the value of the information
obtained or the damage caused.
General Guidelines
Protection measures against man made disasters are:
A.

The best possible site for a computer complex would be an

isolated one.

The more remote a site is and the less cover

available, the easier it is to control the access.

Flat, wideopen,

unpopulated spaces make identification of authorized or unauthorized
persons simple.
B.

The air conditioning system should be entirely self-

contained and not linked to any other area; there should be no
exte·rnal access to ventilation systems or insurgents may be able to
introduce various noxious or toxic gases.
'

C.

There should be only one door for regular access to the

data processing center.

Any other doors for fire escape purposes

should be kept 1ocked from inside, it should not be possible to
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open them from the outside; internal keys should be kept behind
break-glass panels.

It may be possible to use push-bar escape

doors.
D.

A perimeter barrier (wall or fence), guards and patrols,

electronic burglar detectors, secure windows, strong locked doors,
reinfor·ced roofs, burglar-proof safes and store rooms, and others
are possible protective mechanisms that the security planner must
consider.
E.

There are many electronic innovations available to protect

the computer center against intruders, some of these are:

light

beam (or laser, ultraviolet or infrared radiation), magnet
detectors, ultrasonic and radar detectors, closed-circuit television,
theft detectors, magnetic strip and card readers, time-lapse
cameras and electronic combination locks.
F.

When evaluating the potential threats, it is necessary to

estimate the likely level of effort the intruder might be willing
to exert to achieve his goal.
common criminals, activists,

Some of the threats may come from:
espio~age

agents, vandals, riot,

strikes, sabotage and mischief.
G.

The following areas constitute a minimum set to be

analyzed to determine permissible access) both during operational
periods and when the facility is closed:
storage library, input/output

area~

computer room, data

data conversion area,

programmer at'eas, document 1ibrary, corrmuni cations equipment area,
computer maintenance room, mechanical equipment room, telephone
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closet and supplies storage.
H.

The security planner should consider the human resources

available to support xhe physical protection plan.

In addition to

full-time guards, the following people may, as permitted by regular
duties, be able to participate:

receptionists and information desk

personnel, building and grounds maintenance staff, shipping and
receiving clerks, messengers, area supervisors and mail room
personnel.
I.

Access controls cannot be too stringent because this

could inhibit the smooth operation of the shop, frustrate loyal
employees and cause bright employees to seek some way to circumvent
the system.

A lax set of controls tends to indirectly authorize

employees access to data which may satisfy their curiosity, but it
is not part of their jobs.

J.

Precious files should be identified with specially colored

labels and they will be kept under more rigorous control than the
regular files.
Hardware and Utility Failures
Statement of The Problem
The typical computer system is composed of many interconnected
units which perform the functions necessary to perform its assigned
data processing tasks.
The computer, its various peripherals and the electric power
necessary to keep these units running will fail occasionally.

The
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failure of any element would halt operations if specific measures
are not taken.
system will

The reliability that has been engineered into the

deter~ina.how

often failures will occur.

General Guidelines
To maintain a basic understanding of utilities and hardware
failures, the following actions are nscessary:
A.

The designer of the accuracy and security procedures must

consider all the possible categories of failure and decide the
proper course of action if each occurs.
B.

It is not desirable to start a long-run again if a computer

failure occurs.

Therefore, the run is divided into short segments

and at the end of each segment a check-point is taken, meaning
that enough data has been recorded to restart the run at that point.
C.

The typical automatic data processing procurement will

include standards of performance demonstration required for the
acceptance of a system.
D.

An analysis of the loss potential based on estimates of

failure rates and repair times, will permit the automatic data
processing security planner to identify those hardware units where
failures will be most critical to operations.

Additionally, it

will serve as the basis for cost justification of remedial measures,
a guide for development of a contingency plan and as an aid in
future procurement decisions.
E.

The automatic data processing (ADP) security planner
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should be aware of the following alternatives:
Incorporate one or more additional units of
a given -type beyond the minimum required to
have a stand-by type of situation.
Use a substitute technique or alternate
procedure.
Install two or more computers which as a
group can handle the normal work load.

If

one computer fails, only the least critical
tasks will be interrupted.
Install several identically configured
computers so that either system can perform
all assigned tasks. -This approach may be
used only for extremely critical or high risk
missions.

F.

Establish adequate policy and procedures for management

of hardware maintenance.

Effective maintenance management should

include:
Determine the optimum schedule and scope of
preventive maintenance.
Report and perform statistical analysis on
hardware failures so as to detect significant
failure trends and take remedial measures on
a timely basis.
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Remedial maintenance should also receive
continuing attention.

Efforts to reduce

the mean·time of repair should be cost
effective.
G.

There must be procedures to handle operations when the

failure of the computer system is partial. The system may be able
to give a degraded form of service; when a component goes out, an
alternative means of processing should be available.
Some important terms for the systems planner are the following:
Fallback:

The system modifies its mode of operation
to circumvent the error.

Fail softly:

·The system uses alternative means of
processing rather than collapsing
completely in the

eV~ent

that a

component goes out.
Bypass procedure: Standby procedure that enables the
regular continuation of critical
operations without assistance from
the computer.
H.

System controls should not allow errors or security

vi o1ati ons dur'i ng the periods of di ffi cul ty when fa i 1ures are
encountered.
I.

Computer and terminal operators must be carefully

trained tn what to do

wh~n

failures occur.

initiate the fallback and recovery action.

They must be able to
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J.

The ADP security planner should consider the probability

of occurrence and the consequences in the event of failure of the
following supporting -utilities: electric power, air conditioning,
communi cations, water, e.levators and general supplies.
Description of The Physical Area Questionnaire
This section includes facility access controls for visitors
and employees, guarding and surveillance activities, fire
prevention, alanm systems, maintenance and safety, as seen in
Table 5.
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TABLE 5
---

PHYSICAL SECTION COMPARISON OF RESPONSES
% OF 11 YES II

LARGE
FIRMS

1.
B.l..l.

8.1.2.
2.
8.2 .. 1.

8.2.2.
B.2.3.

3..
8.3.1.

SMALL
FIRMS

QUESTION
ACCESS CONTROLS
If badges do not have means to prevent
100
alteration, are employee badges issued
and returned as employees enter or
leave, and are all other badges kept on
the premises always accounted for?
67
Are there access control procedures
defined to handle visitors, maintenance,
service and other personnel?
PROTECTION EQUIPMENT
100
Is surveillance and fire extinguishing
equipment checked regularly?
100
Are there readily accessible portable
(or hand-hose system) fire extinguishers
in and around the computer facflity?
100
Is there an alarm system with smoke
censors and automatic fire extinguishing equipment (such as water sprinklers,
carbon dioxide, high-expansion foam, or
Halon) located in the computer facility
and data library or area where magnetic
tapes, disks, and other records are
stored?
HOUSEKEEPING
Are all accumulations of flarrmable material 100
in or around the data processing site
removed to avoid a potential fire hazard?

0

60

40
60

40

40

I

--
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Analysis of The Results
Large organizations are applying most of the basic protection
measures

investigated~y

the questionnaire.

The access control

procedures can be improved in some companies if the data processing
and library centers are relocated to a building (or floor of a
building) exclusively for their use and coded locks used (magnetic
strips).
Small firms can very inexpensively improve methods of
protection in this area.

As discussed earlier in the Personnel

Section, badges are not very costly; access control procedures can
be

implew~nted

without going to very sophisticated and expensive

equipment, by using locks (combination, magnetic or regular) in the
doors which lead to the computer center and data library.

The fire

extinguishing equipment (automatic or manual) should be checked
regularly (following manufacturer•s specifications) to assure proper
functioning in the event of an emergency.

Some means of directing

early fires are necessary to avoid the spreading of flames, for this
there are smoke and heat censors available at reasonable prices.
The removal of

fl~able

materials from the data processing

and library centers is important in order to avoid a potential fire
hazard.

Carbon copies and liquid cleaners can be kept in fire-

proof storage areas (special plastic or steel cabinets).
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Data, Programs and Documentation Section
Statement of The Problem
Computer applications can be manipulated by altering the input
data or the software.
Software are sets of instructions which are stored in the
computer memory bank or in

off-lin~

disks, cards and cassettes).
used in computer systems:

storage devices (magnetic tapes,

There are two major types of software

operating system software and user or

application software.
The operating system is a set of programs (generally provided
by

the hardware manufacturer) which provides Services to the
11

computer user.

The services rendered by the operating system

software vary \'lith the .size of the computer system.
of these services provided are:
load scheduled

progr~n(s),

Usually, most

schedule an application program,

allocate core, disk and devices to that

program, hand·l e all the Input/Output and interrupts.
t~quirements

11

Security

for operating system will not be discussed in this

report.

The user software is designed to make the computer accomplish
a specific application.

This type of software can be developed

in-house or bought from a

comw~rcial

software firm.

Manipulation of user programs is divided into two classes:
first, the program itself can be altered; second, the input data to
the program can be altered

or

both.
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Documentation is the means

by

which a current status of the

system is described; instructions on how to operate the system,
recovery procedures .tn- case of fa i 1ure, testing and security
measures should be included as part of the documentation.
An acceptable level of security in this area can be obtained
by

the use of highly detailed and accurate procedures; operating

instructions and documentation; programs, data and storage controls,
and record handling procedures.
General Guidelines
Control and security procedures which should be included
under data, programs and documentation are the
A.

fo~lowing:

Basic controls over the accuracy of the operation may

help to minimize erroneous operations and therefore, maintain a
high degree of control.

Some of these accuracy controls are:

Verify data after keypunching; the verifier
operator and the card punch operator should
be two different persons.
Input validation checks.
. A quality-control function to sample the
accuracy of data could be established.
Errors could be analyzed

by

sources, type,

quantity, magnitude, age and any other factors
that might help to control
problems.

t~em

and pinpoint
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B.

Types of data validation checks that should be

established are:
Charactar checks (test for numeric, alphabetic,
special character, blanks and sign).
Field checks (limit test, range test, valid
item, consistency, sequence check,
reasonableness test).
Transaction checks (test for completeness,
serial number checks, false punching and
valid item).

Batch checks (transaction count, batch
control totals, hash totals and batch

number checks).
C~

External controls by means of a control group.

This

input/output control group is the interface between the users and
the computer operations.
D.

Data, programs and associated documentation should be

controlled to the extent that they are available only to the
personnel actually involved with their use and development.
E.

If the information being transmitted from one center to

another is confidential and highly sensitive, cryptography can be
used to prevent the unauthorized individuals from having access to
the text.
F~

Programs should be tested for improbable, illegal and

impossible input.

There should be a test criteria for all programs
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depending on in1portance, function, complexity and sensitivity.

G.

Every change in any program should be authorized,

certified and documented with no exceptions.

H.

Installation of a new program should occur only after

thorough program and system tests have been completed and approved.
I

No

progr~-

should be accepted without adequate and complete

documentation which has been reviewed and approved by a control
group.

I.

The chief programmer team concept, which will tend to

make a program module less of an individual possession, should be
considered as a possible implementation in the programming control
program.

J.

Better

doc~~entation

procedures, structured design and

structural programming will facilitate the reading of programs and
therefore, increase the control over programming.

K.

The security planner should consider what algorithms,

mathematical processes or computer processing schedules are
valuable to a competitor and protect them against any transgressor
access.
L.

Every program documentation package should contain:

program description, system flowchart, program flowchart, current
compilation or assembly listing, record layouts, sample inputs/
outputs, operating instructions, job control cards, control access
codes, program changes log and documentation.
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M.

Four principles that summarize a number of preventive

rreasures are:
The programming and operational work should
be divided into slices handled by different
groups.
Only authorized programs may be run in the system.
The computer-room hardware should be handled
exclusively by operations personnel.
Programmers must be fully aware that their work
is being monitored and that audit trai 1Js.. wi 11
make it possible to pin the blame for any
malfunction.

N.

Standard security procedures should be established and

made required of all computer personnel.
Description of The Questionnaire Regarding Data
Programs and The

Docur~ntation

Area

This area was designed to collect information about data
library procedures and access controls; use of operating
instructions and documentation; storage facilities; data handling;
retention and destruction processes; also logging and control over
equipment's use.

Reference Table 6.
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TABLE 6
DATA, PROGRAMS AND DOCUMENTATION SECTION
COMPARISON OF RESPONSES
-.-

OF "YES
LARGE
SMALL
FIRMS
FIRMS
0/
to

1.
E.l.l. 1.
E.l.l.2.
E.l.l.3.

E.l.2.

E.l.3.

E.1.4.

E. 1.5.
E.l.6.

QUESTION
ACCESS AND CONTROL FOR DATA PROGRAMS
Do computer generated reports have:
i} A cover sheet which contains job
identification, files used, date
and security classification?
ii) Each page numbered sequentially?
iii} Follow the last page of output
with a statement signifying end
of output, security classification
and number of pages printed?
Are there systematic procedures for the
disposal of sensitive information? Are
old printouts, carbon paper, tapes,
ribbons, and documents exempted and
shredded?
Are magentic tapes, disks, documents,
microfilms and other supplies kept in
fire-proof and water-proof vaults and
out of sight?
Are computer forms which might be used to
perpetrate embezzlement or fraud, such as
continuous form checks and official
notices, imprinted with sequential
numbers which are recorded to control
usage of these forms?
Is an up-to-date list of computer
applications and programs maintained
in catalog form?
Are there controls to ensure that
material from the data library are
issued and delivered to authorized
personnel only, and a library log
maintained to ensure close control and
prompt return of materials after use?

II

67

40

67
33

60
20

100 .

60

100

50

100

60

100

60

100

0

50

TABLE 6 -- Continued

E.1.7.

E.l.8.

E. 1. 9.

E.l.lO.

2.
E.2.1.

E.2.2.
E. 2. 3.

E.2.4.

UESTION
Are authorized lockwords, keys, or
encoded badges to enable the
operation of time-sharing, remote
job entry, and other on-line terminals?
As part of security measures for on-line
systems, are reports regularly produced
showing attempts to use invalid lockwords and illegal procedures?
Where general purpose data base
management systems are used, are
sensitive or privileged data elements
controlled by security codes which must
match the user's authorization level to
enable them to be accessed?
.Are financial and asset control systems
transactions placed under control at
their point of origination?

% OF 11 YES''
ARGE
SMALL
FIRMS
FIRMS
67
25

67

25

100

0

100

50

LOGS AND INSTRUCTIONS
Are written procedures provided to
100
instruct the console operator to what
actions are to be taken when the
system controls and counts do not check
out, unanticipated equipment difficulties,
or program running problems such as
unexplained messages or halts?
67
Are "file protect rings" for tapes
removed immediately after a tape is
created and dismounted from tape drive?
33
Is a rule enforc~d requiring that when
occupied, at least two people be present
in the data processing center?
100
Is checking and enforcement of security
procedures during operations designated
as a specific responsibility of
appropriate supervisory personnel?

60

0

0

40
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TABLE 6 -- Continued
---

E.2.5.

E.2.6.

E.2.7.

E.2.8.

QUESTION
Are operations on off shifts spot
checked? Do the logs and audit
paperwork always reflect the actual
status?
Are data received or issued by the
data processing department logged in
by batch showing date, time, name of
data, quantity, from whom data were
received and to whom it was issued?
Does the console wri-tten log sheet run
identification, setup time, processing
start/stop time, malfunctions and down
time? Are these logs carefully checked
by operations supervisors for completeness and accuracy, and analyzed for
recurrent problems and anomalies? .
Are data processing equipment central
processing unit (CPU) meters
regularly read, logged, and reviewed
for possible unauthorized use of
equipment?

% OF

LARGE
FIRMS
67

11

YES"

SMALL
FIRMS

25

33

20

67

20

100

60
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Analysis of The Results
Both large and small companies should increase the usage
of cover sheets (contalning job identification, security
classification, date, files used), sequentially numbered pages and
a last page (signifying end of output, total number of pages, and
security classification) in order to improve controls over theft of
information.
To obtain information from the system or change existing
data, it is necessary to have access to the system.

If access to

the system is to be limited to authorized personnel only, then
authorized lockwords, keys or encoded badges should be used to
enable the operation of time-sharing, remote job entry terminals.
It is important to have reports that show

att~mpts

to use

invalid keywords and illegal procedures, this information will alert
the security officer of possible threats and the code or keyword
designer with a measure of the user's difficulty in using the passwords or codes .
It should be a policy that at least two people be in the
computer center when this is in operation.

If an accident occurs

one person can help the other and moreover, it is harder to alter
data or steal information if someone else is present.
The data received and issued by the data processing department
should be logged in by showing date, name, quantity, from whom data
was received and to whom it was issued.
the degree of control.

This procedure will augment

The unauthorized use of equipment can be
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detected and controlled by checking regularly the CPU meters and
reviewing the··console written log.
Backup

Sectio~

Statement of The Problem

\1\vt

~~·ct, A failu·re iri hardware, software or personnel is to be
expected.

Failures and errors are inevitable in the operation of

any computer system, therefore, the security planner, systems
analysts and management should plan on how to handle the computer
operations when failure occurs.
Most companies cannot afford operational shutdowns; the
business may come to a

halt ~

moreover the computer downtime can be

very expensive and may cause costly delays in accomplishing some
critical functions.
Backup operations may take place on-site when there is only a
.

partial loss of capability but may require one or more off-site
locations when there has been major damage or destruction.
The emergency procedures necessary when a failure occurs vary
with the type of equipment and its use in the operation.
less, some general procedures can be stated.

Neverthe-

Security in this area

may be obtained by the careful planning and coordination of backup
facilities, interruptions and failure recovery procedures.
General Guidelines
Backup resources should be available when needed.
general principles to provide backup facilities are:

Some
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A.

An effective planning approach should include an

appraisal of each individual piece of equipment and the effects
of its failure in the -overall processing system; followed by laying
out a plan for an alternate method of processing.

B. An equipment feasibility study should balance the need
for backup equipment with the requirements of financial reality.
C.

Backup equipment should not be located in the same site

because the same disaster can cripple both the principal and backup
equipment.

D.

It is important that approved security procedures

continue in force, even if the data processing center is
functioning under emergency operations.

E.

It may be advisable to explore having available

electrical power backup, temporary power source, an independent
air conditioning backup and trained personnel backup.

F. Assurance that compatible backup facilities will be
available during a crisis is a very critical point.

Identical

hardware is not sufficient to assume that both systems configurations
are the same.

G.

A written agreement should be signed by officials of

both companies that are involved in an agreement to exchange backup
fa ci 1i ties .
H.

If a satisfactory backup contract cannot be worked out

with a computer service bureau or a nearby compatible data

55

processing center, then it may be necessary to go to the additional
expense to maintain redundant systems.

I.

Data preparation facilities, proper forms and other data

media should be considered in the overall backup plan.

J.

Some basic guidelines to stretch the 'backup facilities

are:
Postpone less urgent tasks.
Substitute other procedures.
Modify tasks to reduce run time.
K.

Each backup plan should cover these five basic areas:
Performance specifications (performance of each
· task will depart from normal).
User instructions (emergency procedures, what to do).
Technical requirements for each data processing task
(documentation of operational requirements for each
task).
Computer system specifications (terms and cost of
backup use, location of the system, schedule of
availability for backup operation, and the tentative
schedule of ADP tasks to be performed on the system).
Administrative information (special personnel
assignments and procedures, temporary employment,
use of special messengers and other departures
from normal).
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, L. A recovery planning program should be started once the
damages have been calculated and basic requirements have been
defined (floor space to house the ADP facility, ADP hardware,
supplies and utilities).

,·M •. The security planner may propose some types of insurance
coverage and management will decide what to do.
insurance coverage are: equipme-n t and facilities;

Some types of
sto~age

media

and its contents; loss due to business interruption; extra expense
at a backup site; valuable papers and records; malpractice,
including human errors and omissions.
Description of The Questionnaire Concerning The Backup Area
. Equipment backup and fallback, contingency plans, agreements
with the backup site and protection of support facilities are
considered in this section as in Table 7.

57

TABLE 7
BACKUP SECTION COMPARISON OF RESPONSES
---

% OF YES n
LARGE -sMAlL
FIRMS
FIRMS
11

1.
1 . 1.
1 . 1 . 1.

1.1.2.
1. 1 . 3.

1.1.4.

1. 2.

1 . 3.

. 1. 4.

1. 5.

1.6.
1 .6. 1.
1.6.2.

1.6.3.

1.6.4.

QUESTION
BACKUP AND FALLBACK
Have contingency plans and priorities been
developed and tested out for the handling
of computer shutdowns for a period of:
i) 1-3 days
ii) 1 week
iii) 2 weeks
iv) more than two weeks
Is backup computer equipment configuration
checked often for changes and alterations
that could affect compatibility for backup
purposes?
Is it realistic to expect that appropriate
data processing equipment can be made
available at time of need in quantity
sufficient to enable near normal
functioning?
Are there adequate physical damage
protections ·for support facilities external
to the building such as: air conditioning,
telephone, electric power and water?
Have procedures for operating at the backup
site been documented?
Does the agreement with the backup site
cover:
i) Physical access by your operations
people?
ii) Priorities, in the event you are
dynamically sharing their equipment?
iii) Charges for services received?
iv) Assignable locked storage for holding
your classified materials?

33
0

20

0
0

0
0

67

40

67

40

100

20

67

0

67

20

67

20

33

0
0

0

J

33
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TABLE 7 -- Continued
I

1.6.5.

1. 7.

.% OF "YES 11
LARGE
SMALL

QUESTION
v) Use of telephones &office areas?

FIRMS

--

Are the costs of maintaining portability
of applications and compatibility of
computer systems included in your
regular budget?

I

FIRMS

33

20

100

20

I

I

I

I
I
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Analysis of The Results
It can be noticed from the results obtained that contingency
plans have not been developed and properly tested out.

Both large

and small organizations must improve in this area in order to avoid
a complete halt of operations for several days.
It is not sufficient to expect that compatible backup
equipment will be available when needed.

More than just one

facility should be available. Also, a signed contract should exist
\

specifying the cost for services, the amount of time available,
storage, telephone and office areas, access and any other special
procedures.
The protection for support facilities will change from zone
to zone.

The. Orlando area is within a critical zone of tornadoes

and thunderstorms.
It is important to analyze how thes·e events wi 11 affect the
performance of the equipment and how much backup or protective
measures are required.
Program Development Section
Statement of The Problem
The data processing security planner and his staff can
identify a set of remedial measures which appear to be the most
effective against all threats, but all they can do is recommend
this group of remedial measures.

It is up to management to

approve what actions should be taken.
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Two phases of security are:

the responsibility for the

design of security techniques and procedures, and the responsibility
for the day-to-day -operations given that design.

In both areas the

overall responsibility lies with management.
Data processing management (and the security staff) should be
aware that it is their duty to maintain top management informed
of the organization's vulnerability if a disaster should strike its
computer system.
Top management should see that an overall strategy for
security is established and that the security procedures are
strictly enforced.
General Guidelines
Some procedures and management actions are necessary to
maintain a sound security program, such as:
A.

Inforn1ation such as that which follows should be made

available to management:
Significant threats and probabilities of
occurrence.
Critical tasks

an~

the loss of potential

related to each threat.
A list of remedial measures which will
yield the greatest net reduction in losses,
together with their annual cost.
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B.
divided.

The responsibilities for secure design should be
One possible way is:
Overall -coordination
. Technical design
•

Procedural controls
Controls on programs and programmers
Physical security

•

External administrative controls
Auditors

C.

The responsibilities for maintaining security of

day-to-day operations may be divided as follows:
Data-processing manager
Security administrator
Local security officers
File owners
Line managers
Auditors
All staff
D.

Management should enforce security procedures that will

ensure the integrity and accuracy of the data required to plan
and control the enterprise, provide for the privacy of proprietary,
personal, privileged or otherwise sensitive data, and protect
and conserve the organization•s assets from natural disasters,
man made hazards, vandalisms and theft.
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E.

The strategy for security should be a sound, continuing

one, not, as has often been the case, one based on passing fashion
or reactions to emergencies.
Description of The Questionnaire Related To The
Program Development Area
This section deals with the design and implementation of
computer programs and control procedures.

It also includes a set

of questions about the· documentation included in each program and
regulations such as: audit trails, information loss, error
detection and balances.

This information is detailed in Table 8.
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TABLE 8
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT SECTION
· COMPARISON OF RESPONSES
..-

1•
1 •1 .

1. 2.

1. 3.

1. 4.

1. 5.
1.5.1.
1.5.2.
1. 5. 3
1.5.4.
1.5.5.
1.5.6.
1.5.7.
1. 5. 8.
1.5.9.
1.5.10.

QUESTION
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT PROCEDURES
Are .systems audit and control procedures
for new systems designs put through a
formal approval process by the internal
audit department?
With regard to. programming, are logic
reviews conducted with a programming
manager or another programmer to minimize
the probability of undetected logic errors
that could crop up during live systems
operations?
Are there established standards that
specify the internal construction and
programming techniques to be used for
secure application programs?
Is program certification performed under
the surveillance of an internal auditing
or quality assurance group administra~
tively separate from the programmers
who performed the coding?
Does the documentation package include
for each program:
i) Program description?
ii) System flowchart?
iii) Current compilation or assembly
listing?
iv) Record 1ayouts?
v) Sample input/output?
vi) Operating instructions?
vii) Job control cards?
viii) Program changes (date,description,
approva 1)
ix) Control access codes?
x) Duplicate documentation stored
off-premises?

% OF 11 YES"
LARGE
SMALL
FIRMS
FIRMS
100

33

100

50

67

20

67

0

100
100
100

100
100
100

100
100
100
67
100

100
0

67
33

67
100
100
0 '
33
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TABLE 8 - Continued
% OF 11 YES II

1.6 ..

1.7.1.
1.7.2.
1.7.3.
1 . 7. 4.
1.7.5.
1.7.6.
1.7.7.

QUEST-ION
Are one or more individuals on the
internal audit staff capable of
interpreting program coding and
writing basic programs?
Are there appropriate techniques for:
i) Proper sequencing?
ii) Batch totals?
iii) Record counts?
i v) Transaction completeness?
v) Tests for minimum and maximum
values?
vi) Error-checking and control
routines for input validity?
vii) Exception reporting where arith~
metic data on file exceeds
predetermined customary range?

LARGE
FIRMS

I

SMALL
FIRMS

100

25

100
100
100
33
33

40
80
40
40
20

100

40

67

20
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Analysis of The Results
It is vital ·to maintain control over the computer programs in
order to prevent

fr~a_url

or embezzlement.

The results show that small

companies do not exercise enough regulation over the internal
construction of computer programs and the certification of these

by

an internal audit or a quality assurance group.
Both, large and small companies should increase their control
over computer programs.

Most of the incidents (stealing of money

or other assets) have occurred because of the lack of appropriate
controls.
Improvement in the areas of predefined customer ranges and
exception reporting system is necessary to detect drastic changes
from the customary actions.
System and operational documentation is necessary for
recovery in case of a disaster.
The results show low usage of off-premises storage of
documentation.
Record counts and transaction completeness are important
factors in the accuracy of the system; this is another area that
should become better controlled.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
As is stated in International Business Machines
Corporation, Data Processing Division 1974, p.l:
With the greater use of computers, security has taken
on new importance, a different dimension. More of your
working information is stored in the system. You are more
dependent on this single source for collected information.
And this concentration of assets in one spot increases
their vulnerability. So it is to your advantage to know
how to protect your computer and its environment.
It is very important to understand the role that
security plays in computer systems in order to dedicate
the necessary resources to the development of efficient
protective measures.
It is unfortunate that( "Computer Security •.. the Imperative
Nuisance .. , 1974, p.24):
To many executives, security means an elderly, grayhaired guard sleeping out his semi-retirement at a factory
door, silver tape around the windows and a fire extinguisher
hanging in the hall. Nobody likes to think about security.
No one wants to believe it.•s really needed.
These two ideas summarize the l c~ncepts that were desired to
discuss in the process of writing this r:'eport •.
Automatic data processing security, privacy and confidentially problems have introduced serious stresses to management
and the computer practitioner.

It is the responsibility of these

people to ensure that a firm•s privacy and assets are protected
against malefactors.

Instead of finding that some minimum

standards of security have been required in all firms, it has been
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found that the remedial measures differ markedly in their
popularity of use.
If more proficient security systems are to be used, it ~ s
necessary to define some basic areas that need to be controlled
and design basic protective, preventive and detection measures , ~

1

In this study, five areas have been presented (personnef , -4
physical, backup, development, data, programs. and documentation)
and the design and implementation of general countermeasures
defined.
Basic concepts were defined and can be summarized as follows:
Privacy is a property of individuals. Confidentiality
is a property of data. Security is a property possessed
by hardware and software systems· and facilities.
(Davis 1974, p.23).
As has been discussed, there is not a set of solutions that
will solve everybody•s security problems. A procedure however,
has been suggested for developing and implementing a security
program.

These steps are:
Analyze risk as the basis for development of a
security policy (audit and appraise the potential
security exposure).
Select and implement appropriate security
measures to reduce exposure to losses.
Develop contingency plans for

back~ap

disaster recovery and emergencies.

operation,

l
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Provide indoctrination

and- ~raining

for personnel .

Plan and conduct continuing tests and audits and
adjust security measures and contingency plans as
needed.
It must be emphasized that the effective use and design of
security procedures will depend upon steps taken by management.
All concerned must be convinced of management•s determination to see that the security measures are conscientiously
executed and appropriately followed ·!Up. \
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APPENDIX
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